Contractor’s
lien determined in insolvency
proceedings
Article 2242 of the Civil
Code provides that the claims of Contractors
engaged in the construction, renovation, or
repair of buildings shall be preferred with
respect to the specific building or other
immovable property constructed. However, Article
2242 applies only when the same property of the
debtor is saddled with the claims of several
creditors and the value of such property is
insufficient to pay in full all the
creditors.
In such a situation there will arise a need
to determine which of the creditors will be paid
ahead of the others. Due process dictates that
this statutory lien should then only be enforced
in some kind of a proceeding where the claims of
all the preferred creditors may be adjudicated
with binding effect, such as insolvency
proceedings (J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court
of Appeals).
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Forcible entry
or unlawful detainer?
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove
that he was in prior physical possession of the
premises until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Secondly, in forcible entry, the
possession of the property by the defendant is
unlawful from the beginning as he acquired
possession thereof by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful
detainer the possession of the defendant is
inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by
reason of the termination of his right to the
possession of the property under his contract
with the plaintiff. Thirdly, in forcible entry,
the law does not require a previous demand for
the defendant to vacate the premises, but in
unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make
such demand (G.R. 149118, 2/6/06).
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Attorney’s fees
The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be
dealth with only in the dispositive portion of
the decision. The text of the decision must
state the reason behind the award of attorney’s
fees. Otherwise, its award is totally
unjustified (G.R. 143361, 2/9/06).
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Cause of action
Well-settled is the rule that the existence
of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state
a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint must be considered (G.R. 146818,
2/6/06).
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Foreign judgment not yet
conclusive
A foreign judgment on the mere strength of
its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it
can be annulled on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or
fact. A foreign judgment may likewise be barred
from recognition if it runs counter to public
policy (G.R. 166429, 2/1/06, citing Rule 39 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure).
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Litis pendentia: same parties, same
cause
Litis pendentia is
the ground for dismissal of an action when there
is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause. But the test of
identity of causes of action lies not in the
form of an action but on whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former
and the present causes of action.
The requisites for litis pendentia
are: (a) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res
adjudicata in the other (G.R. 167900,
2/13/06).
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Appeal opens entire case to
review
It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted
by this Court, throws the entire case open to
review, and that this Court has the authority to
review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary to arrive at a just
resolution of the case (G.R. 157696,
supra, quoting G.R. 133519).
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Dispositive part settles case
It is the dispositive part of the judgment
that actually settles and declares the rights
and obligations of the parties finally,
definitely, authoritatively notwithstanding the
existence of inconsistent statements in the body
that may confuse. It is the dispositive part
that controls [for purposes of executions] (G.R.
157696-97, 2/9/06).
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Assessment of evidence
In assessing the evidence [in a criminal
case] before him, the fiscal considers the basic
rule that to successfully convict the accused
the evidence must be beyond reasonable doubt and
not merely substantial. On the other hand, to
support findings of administrative bodies only
substantial evidence is required (G.R. L-52034,
9/27/88).
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Errors of jurisdiction distinct from
errors of judgment
Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on
certiorari; errors of judgment, only on
appeal (31 SCRA 288).
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Writ of liberty or writ of error?
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus
applies “to all cases ofillegal
confinement or detention by which a person has
been deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of any person has been withheld
from the person entitled thereto.” In
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, the SC declared that
“any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient.”
If, however, an individual’s liberty is
restrained by some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be availed of. In line with
this principle the writ of habeas corpus cannot
be used to directly assail a judgment rendered
by a competent court or tribunal whose
jurisdiction was not deprived or ousted through
some anomaly in the proceedings.
Thus, the writ of habeas corpus has a very
limited availability as a post-conviction
remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition
for the corpus only in very specific instances,
such as when as a consequences of a juridical
proceeding - - -
a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint
of a person;
b) the court has nor jurisdiction to impose
the sentence; or
c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as
such sentence is void as to such excess.
In this case, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the
absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing
the sentence, or that an excessive penalty was
imposed upon him. In effect, petitioner invokes
remedy of habeas corpus to seek the review of
findings of facts long passed upon with
finality. The relief sough is far outside the
scope of habeas corpus proceedings. As the Court
declared in an earlier case (Abriol v. Homeres),
the general rule is that the writ of
habeas corpus is not a writ of error
and should not be thus used (G.R.
158802, 11/17/04).
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Error of judgment not subject to
certiorari under Rule 65
Well-settled is the rule that in a petition
for certiorari, the petitioner must prove not
merely reversible error but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The petitioner alleges that the
appellate court erred in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the trial court on the
basis of its finding that petitioner is liable
for the damage to the cargo as a common carrier.
But what petitioner is disputing is an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction which is properly
the subject of an appeal. Where the issue or
question involves or affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision—not the jurisdiction
of the court to render said decision—the same is
outside the ambit of a petition for certiorari.
Factual issues are beyond the scope of
certiorari because they do not involve any
jurisdictional issue (G.R. 14709, 12/21/04).
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Length of service does not confer
regular employment status
The seven complainants are construction
workers who were part of a work pool from where
the employer, a construction company, drew them
to work in the various projects undertaken by
the company. They were hired and re-hired from
1972 to 1996 but thereafter, their employment
was not renewed.
In 1997, the complainants filed complaints
for illegal dismissal and sundry money claims at
the NLRC against their former employer, who
denied any liability claiming that complainants
were project employees whose employment was
co-terminous with the completion of the project
to which they were assigned.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the complainants
are regular employees in a “work pool” who were
assigned and re-assigned over a period of 18
years to various projects, and whose employment
was terminated without cause. The Arbiter
ordered their reinstatement plus payment of
their money claims: Both the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals affirmed the LA’s decision.
The SC affirmed the ruling
thatthe complainants were
regular employees but not for the reasons given,
i.e. that they belonged to a “work pool” and
were hired and re-hired for over 18 years. The
Court said that employees--such as the
complainants--who work under different project
employment contracts over a number of years do
not automatically become regular employees; they
can remain as project employees regardless of
the number of years they work. Length of service
is not a controlling factor in determining the
nature of a worker’s employment.
The principal test to determine whether
workers are “project” or “regular” employees is
whether they are assigned to a specific project
the duration and scope of which are specified in
a written contract at the time they are engaged
for that project. In this case there was no such
agreement between the complainants and the
respondent company. Hence, in the absence of
such agreement, the complainants are deemed
regular employees (G.R. 141168, 4/10/06).
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Illegally dismissed employee entitled
to both backwages and
reinstatement
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement.
These are separate and distinct from each other.
However, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
is granted where reinstatement is no longer
feasible because of strained relations between
the employee and the employer.
The reinstatement aspect of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision is “immediately executory
even pending appeal.” But the employer has
the option of either admitting the employee back
to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before his
dismissal or merely reinstate him in the
payroll (G.R. 160871, 2/6/06).
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Administrative remedies
Where the issues raised in the petition for
certiorari are questions of law which involve
the interpretation and application of laws,
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
dispensed with (G.R. 160652, 2/3/06).
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Contributory negligence
A plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences
of his own negligence i.e., a deduction of 20%
from the award of actual damages (G.R. 144723,
2/27/06).
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Improper appeal
A party aggrieved by an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal may file appropriate civil
action under Rule 65. Petitioners, however,
erroneously filed an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 (G.R. 134154, 2/28/06).
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Price and manner of payment required
In a contract of sale or contract to sell,
there must be an agreement of the parties, not
only on the price of the property sold, but also
on the manner the price is to be paid by the
vendee (G.R. 158149, 2/9/06).
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Criminal case ruling not binding on
NLRC
Conviction of an employee in a criminal case
is not indispensable to warrant his dismissal.
The fact that a criminal complaint against an
employee has been dropped by the fiscal is not
binding and conclusive upon a labor tribunal
(136 SCRA 544).
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NLRC is empowered to enjoin unlawful
strike
Article 254 of the Labor Code prohibits the
issuance of temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order by any court or other entity
in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes except as otherwise provided under
Articles 218 and 264 of the Code.
The first exception, Article 218 (e),
expressly confers upon the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) the power to
“enjoin or restrain actual and threatened
commission of any or all prohibited acts, or to
require the performance of particular act in any
labor dispute which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual decision in favor of such party.”
On the other hand, the second exception is
when the labor organization or the employer
engages in any of the “prohibited activities”
enumerated in Article 264, such as declaration
of a or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction
by the Secretary of Labor or after certification
of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout. The other prohibited activities are
quoted hereunder:
a) No person shall obstruct, impede, or
interfere with by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation any peaceful picketing
beemployees during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right of
self-organization or collective bargaining, or
shall aid or about such obstruction or
interference.
b) No employer shall use or employ any
strike-breaker, nor shall any person be employed
as strike-breaker.
c) No public official or employee, including
officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the Integrated National
Police, or armed person, shall bring in,
introduce or escort in any manner any individual
who seeks to replace strikers in entering or
leaving the premises of a strike area, or work
in place of the strikers. The police force shall
keep out of the picket lines unless actual
violence or other criminal acts occur therein:
Provided, thatnothing herein shall be
interpreted to prevent any public officer from
taking any measure necessary to maintain peace
and order, protect life and property, and/or
enforce the law and legal order.
d) No person engaged in picketing shall
commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares,
(G.R. No. 1192923, 6/10/03).
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Conclusiveness of
judgment
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also known as “preclusion of issues” or
“collateral estoppel,” issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action
(G.R. 167234, 2/27/06).
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Essence of due process
Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where a party was afforded this
opportunity to participate but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process
(G.R. 169091, 2/16/06).
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Curative statutes are retroactive
Curative statutes which are enacted to cure
defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings which would otherwise be void for
want of conformity with certain legal
requirements, by their very essence, are
retroactive (341 SCRA, 2000).
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Forum shopping
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another or when he institutes
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause of action on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition (G.R. 6971, 2/23/06).
